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Note
The Advent of Effortless Expression: An Examination of
the Copyrightability of BCI-Encoded Brain Signals
Jonathan Baker*
INTRODUCTION
“Some of the most seminal developments in copyright law have
been driven by technological change. . . . [I]t is necessary to reconcile
technology with pre-electronic principles of law.”1 Judge Sweet’s
proposition—that Congress and the judiciary must attempt to harmonize new technologies with deep-seated legal doctrines2—is axiomatic. Indeed, more than a century before Judge Sweet wrote his dissent in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., the Supreme Court
in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony considered whether Congress had the constitutional right to grant copyright protection to a
photograph.3 Justice Miller, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that
the question was “not free from difficulty.”4 Appellants in Burrow-Giles
argued that, contrary to Article I, Section 8 of the United States

* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. I extend my most
sincere gratitude to my mother, father, sister, and grandparents for their unwavering
support during these twenty-six years of life; to Professor Tom Cotter for his outstanding instruction and oversight during the writing process; to Professor Kenneth W. Harl
for his mentorship, through which I learned how to write well, think critically, and appreciate the arts and academia; and to the Minnesota Law Review staffers and editors
whose diligent efforts during the editing process significantly improved this Note. I am
indebted to all mentioned here—and, to be sure, countless others. Copyright © 2020
by Jonathan Baker.
1. Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Sweet, J., dissenting).
2. See id.
3. 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884).
4. Id. at 56.
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Constitution,5 a photograph was neither “a writing nor the production
of an author”6 and accordingly was not eligible for copyright protection.7
The Court was not convinced.8 It reasoned that because the Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1802—each having been penned “by the men
who were contemporary with [the Constitution’s] formation”9—enables Congress to grant copyright protection to “maps, charts, designs,
engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints, it is difficult to see why
Congress cannot make [photographs] the subject of copyright [protection] as well.”10 The Court liberally construed the constitutional meaning of “[w]ritings”11 to encompass all “literary productions of those
authors . . . by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.”12 The Court postulated that “[t]he only reason why
photographs were not included in the extended list in the act of 1802
is probably that they did not exist.”13 The Court therefore found the
Constitution “broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of
photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual
conceptions of the author.”14
Photography would not be the last technology the judiciary
would confront in the copyright context. Innumerable technologies
have emerged since the Supreme Court decided Burrow-Giles in 1884.
Courts and Congress have had to consider whether, inter alia, motion
pictures,15 mass-produced utilitarian articles,16 and computer programs17 are eligible for copyright protection. They will undoubtedly
need to consider whether works created in virtual reality environments are eligible for the same protection.18 The courts and Congress
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have [the] Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
6. 111 U.S. at 56.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 58 (“We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to
cover an act authorizing [the] copyright of photographs.”).
9. Id. at 57.
10. Id.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
16. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
17. See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (1983).
18. See Crystal Nwaneri, Ready Lawyer One: Legal Issues in the Innovation of Virtual Reality, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 601, 619 (2017) (“Although [virtual reality]
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have made clear that, so long as the works derived from new technologies constitute original expressions that are fixed to a copy, such
works are eligible for copyright protection.19
But one additional, implicit requirement for statutory copyright
eligibility may yet exist: the original expression must be fixed to a
copy—that is, given physical permanence and perceptibility20—by the
hand21 of the author at some point during the creative process. An author who thinks about sufficiently original expression but does not
write, type, or speak that expression into the world cannot seek a copyright for her “unexpressed expression” because such “unexpressed
expressions” are merely thoughts.22 Indeed, “unexpressed expressions” become copyrightable expressions when the author fixes them
to a tangible medium.23 And, throughout human history, fixation—
whether by writing, speaking into a recording device, coding software,
or issuing a command to a computer program—has required physical
labor. In other words, creative thoughts (i.e., expressions) are generated in the brain’s neural networks,24 and its motor cortex coordinates
the movements required to write or speak25 (i.e., fix) the creative
thoughts to a tangible medium. Authors have never been able to fix
their expressions by thought alone. “The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor,”26 and those fruits have

environments are new, it is likely that virtual materials will be copyrightable because
the various three-dimensional representations displayed in [virtual reality] will constitute . . . subject matter [eligible for] copyright protection.”).
19. See infra Part I.B (describing these basic requirements).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“The concept of fixation suggests that works are not copyrightable unless reduced to
some tangible form.”); infra Part I.B.3 (describing the “embodiment” and “duration”
requirements of fixation).
21. By this, the Author means that copyrightable expression enters this world
through some degree of physical labor by the author, whether that labor is speaking,
writing, or coding the expression onto the fixed medium.
22. Cf. infra Part I.B.3 (explaining the “fixation” requirement for copyright protection).
23. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(A).
24. See Alison Koontz, The Circuitry of Creativity: How Our Brains Innovate Thinking, CALTECH LETTERS (Mar. 12, 2019), https://caltechletters.org/science/what-is
-creativity [https://perma.cc/Z3CU-GGFG] (detailing the neurological mechanisms behind the origination of creative thought).
25. See CHARLES WATSON, MATTHEW KIRKCALDIE & GEORGE PAXINOS, THE BRAIN 58
(2010).
26. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
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always blossomed through the author’s motor cortex and, by extension, her hand27—until now.
Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) will be among the first devices
to challenge the implicit assumption that copyrightable expression
must be fixed at the direction of the motor cortex.28 BCIs will effectively abridge the traditional, biological process of expression by directly receiving thoughts from neural networks, decoding those
thoughts, and digitally recording—i.e., “fixing”—them to a digital device.29 BCIs, which were initially defined as “communication system[s]
that [do] not depend on the brain’s normal output pathways of peripheral nerves and muscles,”30 are, in essence, “new output channel[s] for
the brain.”31 For the first time, “the fruits of intellectual labor” need
not blossom through the author’s hand. With BCIs, humans will possess the means to express and fix their thoughts without the direction
of the motor cortex, and, so long as these BCI-fixed thoughts are sufficiently original, they would seemingly qualify for copyright protection
under modern copyright doctrine.32 The Copyright Act of 197633 and
the Constitution,34 of course, do not explicitly address granting
27. See Alex Norris, Creativity, DORRIS MCCOMICS (Oct. 21, 2013), https://
dorrismccomics.com/post/64681231561 [https://perma.cc/FX8M-X4MD] (illustrating the birth of creative expression through the author’s hand).
28. One may argue that the emergence of artificial intelligence has already challenged this implicit assumption. See generally Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence
and Copyright, WIPO MAG. Oct. 2017, at 14, 19, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2017/wipo_pub_121_2017_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RS5C-QBR9] (“[G]iven enough computing power, soon we may not be able to distinguish between human-generated and machine-generated content. . . . [I]f and when we
do get there, we will have to decide what type of protection, if any, we should give to
emergent works created by intelligent algorithms with little or no human intervention.”).
29. See Jerry J. Shih, Dean J. Krusienski & Jonathan R. Wolpaw, Brain-Computer
Interfaces in Medicine, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 268, 271 fig.2 (2012) (detailing the basic
components and functions of BCIs).
30. Jonathan R. Wolpaw, Niels Birbaumer, William J. Heetderks, Dennis J. McFarland, P. Hunter Peckham, Gerwin Schalk, Emanuel Donchin, Louis A. Quatrano, Charles
J. Robinson & Theresa M. Vaughan, Brain-Computer Interface Technology: A Review of
the First International Meeting, 8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON REHAB. ENG’G 164, 165 (2000)
(emphasis omitted).
31. Id.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. This act, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122, has been the operative copyright
statute since its enactment.
34. The Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall have [the] Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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protection to works generated through this novel avenue of expression, and whether either authority even contemplates granting protection to BCI-encoded brain signals is quite unlikely. The preliminary
question of whether BCI-encoded brain signals even qualify as expression—under any definition of the word—is similarly shrouded in uncertainty. Ultimately, the advent of BCI technology will challenge the
fundamental assumptions underlying modern copyright doctrine and
burden the judiciary with difficult questions that Congress must ultimately answer.35
This Note consults the history of copyright, its philosophical underpinnings and justifications, and judicial opinions addressing new
technologies in the context of copyright protection to predict how
Congress and the courts will address the implications of BCI technology for U.S. copyright doctrine. Moreover, because BCI technology fundamentally alters the traditional process of expression, this Note
seeks to determine what constitutes expression—at its most basic
level—within the common and constitutional understandings of the
word. This Note ultimately recommends that although BCI-encoded
brain signals qualify for protection under the Copyright Act of 1976,
they should not be copyrightable unless Congress implements an exceptional effort requirement. This requirement would grant copyright
protection to BCI-encoded brain signals only after the author edits or
polishes them to remove the spontaneous thoughts and neuronal
noise36 that a BCI device would capture alongside otherwise discernable and copyrightable expression. The Author will argue that this effort requirement is necessary to bring BCI-encoded brain signals
within the ambit of copyright because, under our constitutionally authorized utilitarian regime,37 the cost of creating a new work of authorship must be sufficiently higher than the cost of its reproduction
if that work is to qualify for copyright protection.38 The cost of creating a work composed of BCI-encoded brain signals alone is not sufficiently higher than the cost of reproducing that work, and a grant of
35. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(“It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so
often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws
that have not yet been written.”); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 463
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Courts] are in no position . . . to foresee the path of future technological development. Hence, the proper course is not to bend and twist the
[Copyright] Act’s terms . . . but to apply the law as it stands and leave to Congress the
task of deciding whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.” (citations omitted)).
36. See infra Part II.C.2.
37. See infra Part I.C.1.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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copyright protection to such signals accordingly does not advance the
utilitarian objectives of U.S. copyright law.39
Part I describes the nature and mechanics of BCI technologies, details the Copyright Act’s requirements for copyright protection, and
examines the history, justifications for, and theoretical underpinnings
of copyright protection. Part II initially dissects the term “expression”
to determine whether BCI-encoded brain signals fall under any acceptable definition of the word. It subsequently analyzes whether
granting copyrightable status to BCI-encoded brain signals advances
the goals of the U.S. copyright regime. Then, Part II illustrates certain
practical problems that would accompany a determination that BCIencoded brain signals are copyrightable. Finally, Part III recommends
that Congress introduce an exceptional “effort requirement” that authors of BCI-encoded brain signals must satisfy before their encoded
signals may qualify for copyright protection.
I. BCI TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT
CLIMATE
An investigation of BCI technology and its implications in the copyright context requires a brief overview of the fundamentals of both.
Section A details the development, underlying mechanisms, and deployment of modern BCI technology. Section B examines the basic
constitutional and statutory requirements any work of authorship
must satisfy to assume copyright protection. Section C discusses the
historical and theoretical underpinnings of the U.S. copyright system.
The assertion that BCI technology poses a challenge to contemporary
copyright becomes apparent with an understanding of the relevant
foundational concepts.
A. BCI TECHNOLOGY
In 1973, after conducting a study to evaluate the “feasibility and
practicality of utilizing the brain signals in a man-computer dialogue,”40 Professor Jacques Vidal suggested that a computer could
gather the information contained in electroencephalographic (EEG)
signals and use that information to issue commands to an external apparatus, thereby allowing the person from which the EEG signals were
gathered to control an external device.41 “Using computer-generated
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. Jacques J. Vidal, Toward Direct Brain-Computer Communication, 2 ANN. REV.
BIOPHYSICS & BIOENGINEERING 157, 157–58 (1973).
41. See id. at 157.

2020]

EFFORTLESS EXPRESSION

395

visual stimulation and sophisticated signal processing,” Vidal demonstrated that EEGs “could provide a communication channel by which
a human could control the movement of a cursor through a two-dimensional maze.”42 Vidal coined the term Brain Computer Interface to
describe this type of system.43 Such a system of “man-machine communication,” Vidal explained, ultimately could “provide a direct link
between the inductive mental processes used in solving problems and
the symbol-manipulating, deductive capabilities of the computer.”44
Vidal suggested that the existence of such a system “would indeed elevate the computer to a genuine prosthetic extension of the brain.”45
Although Vidal’s suggestions may have seemed far-fetched in 1973, he
nonetheless prophesied in his study that “such a feat is potentially
around the corner.”46
Although “the dream of being able to control one’s environment
through thoughts”47 existed only in the realm of science fiction in
1973, technological advancements have permitted BCIs to round Vidal’s proverbial corner. Vidal’s dream of BCI becoming a “genuine
prosthetic extension of the brain” has, or has nearly, manifested. Researchers and practitioners have primarily used BCIs, currently defined as “computer-based system[s] that acquire[], analyze[], and
translate[] brain signals into output commands in real time,”48 to provide means of communication and “improve the quality of life for people severely disabled by neuromuscular impairments.”49 Indeed, these
practical medical applications of BCI caused one researcher writing in
2000 to opine that “the principal reason for . . . interest in BCI development [is] the possibilities it offers for providing new augmentative

42. Wolpaw et al., supra note 30.
43. Jacques J. Vidal, UCLA, http://web.cs.ucla.edu/~vidal/vidal.html [https://
perma.cc/974A-B5F4] (“During the seventies, Vidal coined the expression Brain Computer Interface for his current research project, a part of a large, government sponsored futuristic research in biocybernetics and human-machine interaction.”).
44. Vidal, supra note 40, at 158.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 157.
47. Shih et al., supra note 29, at 268.
48. Dennis J. McFarland & Jonathan R. Wolpaw, Brain-Computer Interface Use Is a
Skill that User and System Acquire Together, PLOS BIOLOGY, July 2018, at 1, 1.
49. Hyun J. Baek, Min Hye Chang, Jeong Heo & Kwang Suk Park, Enhancing the
Usability of Brain-Computer Interface Systems, COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. & NEUROSCIENCE,
June 2019, at 1, 2 (describing the various impairments that can be aided with the use
of BCIs including “amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), brainstem stroke, cerebral
palsy, or spinal cord injury”).
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communication technology to those who are paralyzed or have other
severe motor disabilities.”50
A basic understanding of the human motor control system and
BCI operation reveals why the technology has significant implications
for copyright in addition to medicine. An unimpaired individual interacts and communicates with his or her world through “motor control
processes that use neuromuscular systems to activate and coordinate
muscle movements. An individual’s intent triggers the activation of a
specific brain area, sending signals through the peripheral nervous
system to muscles that perform the movement necessary to complete
the intended task.”51 BCIs restore motor and communicative functions
in impaired persons by acquiring brain signals that would otherwise
travel from the motor cortex to the peripheral nervous system,52 analyzing those acquired signals, and translating them into commands
that are routed to an output device.53 Present-day BCIs thus are akin
to an alternative peripheral nervous system.
BCIs typically consist of four components: (1) signal acquisition;
(2) feature extraction; (3) feature translation; and (4) device output.54
Signal acquisition is the measurement, digitization, and transmission
of brain signals from a sensor—located either on the scalp or intracranially—to a computer.55 Feature extraction “is the process of analyzing the digital signals to distinguish pertinent signal characteristics (ie
[sic], signal features related to the person’s intent) from extraneous
content and representing them in a compact form suitable for translation into output commands.”56 In a copyright context, the feature extraction component of a BCI may remove neuronal noise57 as
50. Wolpaw et al., supra note 30.
51. Baek et al., supra note 49, at 1.
52. See generally Alessandra Donato, Peripheral Nervous System, QUEENSL. BRAIN
INST., https://qbi.uq.edu.au/brain/brain-anatomy/peripheral-nervous-system [https:
//perma.cc/VKC5-THJA] (“Our nervous system is divided [in] two components: the
central nervous system (CNS), which includes the brain and spinal cord, and the peripheral nervous system (PNS), which encompasses nerves outside the brain and spinal cord. . . . If we consider the entire nervous system as an electric grid, the central
nervous system would represent the powerhouse, whereas the peripheral nervous
system would represent long cables that connect the powerhouse to the outlying cities
(limbs, glands and organs) to bring them electricity and send information back about
their status.”).
53. Shih et al., supra note 29, at 269.
54. Id. at 270.
55. See id. at 270–71.
56. Id. at 271.
57. “Neuronal noise” is a term that encompasses the “[r]andom and unpredictable fluctuations and disturbances that are not part of a signal.” A. Aldo Faisal, Luc P.J.
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distinguishable from the “signal features related to the person’s [creative or authorial] intent.”58 Feature translation is the process by
which “[t]he resulting signal features are . . . passed to the feature
translation algorithm, which converts the features into the appropriate commands for the output device.”59 Finally, device output is the
process by which the feature-signals-turned-commands “operate the
external device, providing functions such as letter selection, cursor
control, robotic arm operation, and so forth.”60
Although BCIs often measure and utilize sensorimotor rhythms
(SMRs)61 generated in the sensorimotor cortex,62 the mechanisms and
rapid advancement63 of BCI give reason to believe that such devices
could one day measure and utilize brain signals that are antecedent to
SMRs in the biological process of expression.64 In other words, BCIs
could foreseeably measure the brain signals representing creative
thought itself rather than the signals generated to physically express
that thought (i.e., SMRs). Indeed, one group of researchers recently
published a study that describes their successful attempt to “train a
recurrent neural network to encode . . . sentence-length sequence[s]
of neural activity into . . . abstract representation[s], and then to decode th[ose] representation[s], word by word, into . . . English sentence[s].”65 Studies like these, in addition to other recent

Selen & Daniel M. Wolpert, Noise in the Nervous System, 9 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE
292, 292 (2008). Neuronal noise might account for variability in motor commands and,
consequently, movement. See id. at 298.
58. Shih et al., supra note 29.
59. Id. at 272.
60. Id.
61. See McFarland & Wolpaw, supra note 48. SMRs contain information about
“movement, imagined movement, or preparation for movement.” Id.
62. See, e.g., Han Yuan & Bin He, Brain–Computer Interfaces Using Sensorimotor
Rhythms: Current State and Future Perspectives, 61 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON BIOMEDICAL
ENG’G 1425, 1426 (2014).
63. Indeed, the BCI systems of today “a few years ago were in the realm of science
fiction.” Shih et al., supra note 29, at 276.
64. See id. at 269 (“In principle, any type of brain signal could be used to control
a BCI system.”). See generally Roger E. Beaty, Yoed N. Kenett, Alexander P. Christensen,
Monica D. Rosenberg, Mathias Benedek, Qunlin Chen, Andreas Fink, Jiang Qiu, Thomas
R. Kwapil, Michael J. Kane & Paul J. Silvia, Robust Prediction of Individual Creative Ability
from Brain Functional Connectivity, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1087 (2018) (identifying
the neural networks specific to creativity).
65. Joseph G. Makin, David A. Moses & Edward F. Chang, Machine Translation of
Cortical Activity to Text with an Encoder-Decoder Framework, 23 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
575, 575 (2020).
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advancements in BCI research and development,66 suggest that BCIs
of the future will not be limited to therapeutic and rehabilitative applications; rather, they will be able to acquire the brain signals representing creative thought at their neurological origin, digitize them,
and store those digitized, machine-readable signals on an external device.67 Assuming these digitized brain signals are sufficiently original,
the Copyright Act of 197668 ostensibly will grant protections to such
thoughts despite them never manifesting as traditional expression.
B. BASIC COPYRIGHT REQUIREMENTS
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that “[c]opyright protection
subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”69 The Act further explains that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work
66. On August 28, 2020, billionaire tech entrepreneur Elon Musk unveiled and
exhibited his Neuralink device, a “wireless brain-computer interface” that promises to
“ultimately fuse humankind with artificial intelligence.” Tina Bellon, ‘Three Little Pigs’:
Musk’s Neuralink Puts Computer Chips in Animal Brains, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2020, 11:16
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-neuralink-musk/musks-neuralink
-venture-promises-to-reveal-a-working-brain-computer-device-idUSKBN25O2EG.
“Musk wants Neuralink to do far more than treat specific health conditions. He sees
the technology as an opportunity to build a widely available brain-computer interface
for consumers, which he thinks could help humans keep pace with increasingly powerful artificial intelligence.” Rebecca Heilweil, Elon Musk Is One Step Closer to Connecting a Computer to Your Brain, VOX (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2020/8/28/21404802/elon-musk-neuralink-brain-machine-interface
-research.
67. See Shih et al., supra note 29 (illustrating the digitized, machine-readable binary form into which an external device encodes acquired brain signals). The device
on which the digitized, machine-readable signals are stored could perhaps decompile
the machine-readable signals into a human-readable source code form. See EREZ METULA, MANAGED CODE ROOTKITS: HOOKING INTO RUNTIME ENVIRONMENTS 42 (2011) (“[A] decompiler . . . transfers compiled [binary code] to corresponding high-level source
code.”); Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ronald S. Laurie, Source Code Versus Object Code:
Patent Implications for the Open Source Community, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 235, 238 (2002) (“Source code has been described as a computer program
written in a high level human readable language.”). The author could subsequently edit
the human-readable source code in the same way she would edit a word document.
See generally Source Code: What Exactly Is It?, IONOS (July 2, 2020), https://www
.ionos.com/digitalguide/websites/web-development/source-code-explained-definition-examples/ [https://perma.cc/4D3C-YW6Z] (explaining the use of advanced text
editors, which can simplify source code projects by providing various tools such as
syntax highlighting).
68. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122.
69. Id. § 102(a).
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of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”70 Sections 102(a)–(b) supply four basic requirements that a
work must satisfy to qualify for copyright protection: (1) “work of authorship;” (2) originality; (3) fixation; (4) idea/expression dichotomy.71
1. Work of Authorship
Copyright protection subsists only in “works of authorship.” Although the Copyright Act of 1976 does not define a “work of authorship,”72 § 102(a) states that “[w]orks of authorship include . . . (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural works.”73 Although § 102(a)’s list of
categories is exhaustive, the categories are fairly broad.74 Types of “literary works” subject to copyright protection are not limited to novels
or other traditional works of literature, but rather include “works . . .
expressed in . . . words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in
which they are embodied.”75 Software, for example, is a literary work
for copyright purposes.76 Although the categories enumerated in
§ 102(a) are implicitly broad,77 Congress possesses the constitutional
power to protect other explicit categories of potentially protectable
works through either an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976 or
the enactment of a new statute.78 For now, any work seeking copyright
70. Id. § 102(b).
71. Id. § 102(a)–(b).
72. See id. § 101.
73. Id. § 102(a).
74. See Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78
U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 51 (2016) (“[T]he [Copyright] Act [of 1976] defines enumerated subject matter categories broadly enough so that many unforeseeable creations . . . have
generally fit quite comfortably within the 1976 Act categories.”).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
76. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“While computer programs are not specifically listed as part of [§ 101’s definition of
‘literary works’], . . . Congress intended them to be considered literary works.” (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667)).
77. See Samuelson, supra note 74.
78. See, e.g., supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
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protection must fit, however loosely, into one of the categories enumerated in § 102(a).79
2. Originality
Although the Copyright Act of 1976 defines many of the key terms
used throughout its provisions, “originality” is noticeably absent.80
The courts have determined that “originality” requires only “independent creation81 plus a modicum of creativity.”82 The Supreme
Court has also offered guidance as to what qualifies as an original
work. In Burrow-Giles, the Court found originality in a photograph that
was “entirely from [the author’s] mental conception, to which he gave
visible form by posing [his subject] in front of the camera, selecting
and arranging the costume, . . . arranging the subject,” and ultimately
producing the photograph at issue.83 The expression embodied in the
photograph, the Court stated, showed the photograph “to be an original work of art, the product of the plaintiff’s intellectual invention.”84
Later, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court more precisely stated that a protectable work “must be original, that is, the author’s tangible expression
of his ideas.”85 A robust description of originality comes not from the
Supreme Court, but from the Second Circuit in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.:
79. See R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1489 (2014) (“Currently, the 1976 Copyright
Act protects a very broad range of subject matter, though its reach is not unlimited.
Perfume, for example, falls outside all of the categories of subject matter protected in
the current statute.”); Samuelson, supra note 74, at 91 (“Congress may have intended
to provide a modest amount of room for common law expansion of copyright subject
matter . . . but there are good reasons to doubt that Congress intended to enable all
manners of unenumerated subject matters . . . to be incorporated into the copyright
regime.”).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
81. It is important to note that “[i]t is possible . . . to obtain a copyright in a work
that is identical to an earlier work, so long as the author did not copy from the earlier
work, either consciously or subconsciously.” Copyright Basics, U. MICH. LIBR., https://
guides.lib.umich.edu/copyrightbasics/copyrightability
[https://perma.cc/XPP3
-ERSV] (last updated June 17, 2020); see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228,
1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n the realm of copyright, identical expression does not
necessarily constitute infringement. Just as two paintings of the same subject in nature
may appear identical, the two paintings’ origins may be of independent creation.”
(footnotes omitted)).
82. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (footnote
added) (citing Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
83. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
84. Id.
85. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
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“Original” in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work
“owes its origin” to the “author.” . . . It is clear, then, that nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly unique or novel. . . .
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
“author” contributed more than a “merely trivial” variation, something recognizably “his own.” Originality in this context “means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.”86

Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed judges not to consider even
the artistic merit of an author’s work in determining whether it is sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection.87 “A copyist’s bad
eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations” to qualify a
work as original.88
A provision of works that the courts have determined qualify for
copyright protection will better illuminate the originality requirement. Works that have qualified for copyright protection include: a
“panned and scanned” adaptation of a movie and its soundtrack;89 a
reduced-size copy of Rodin’s Hand of God;90 and a reference guide for
the fashion, advertising, and visual productions industries containing
800 pages of names and contact information.91 These independently
created works all possessed the “extremely low” requisite level of creativity92 to qualify for copyright protection. Originality is an indisputably low bar for an author to hurdle.93

86. 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951) (footnotes omitted) (quoting BurrowGiles, 111 U.S. at 57–58; then quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513
(2d Cir. 1945); and then quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d
583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
87. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge.”).
88. Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 105.
89. Maljack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
aff’d sub nom. Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223 (9th
Cir. 1998).
90. Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
91. Le Book Publ’g, Inc. v. Black Book Photography, 418 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
92. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
93. See RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE WORLD OF IDEAS 105 (2013) (“If the bar [for originality] in patent is perhaps too
low, in copyright it is nearly resting on the floor.”).
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3. Fixation
“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”94 Section 101 provides:
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed”
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.95

It further defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine.”96 Further, “[t]he term
‘copies’ includes the material object . . . in which the work is first
fixed.”97 It is important to note that a work of authorship is “created”
the moment it is fixed to a copy.98
The courts have determined that fixation has two requirements:
an “embodiment requirement” and a “duration requirement.”99 A
work satisfies the embodiment requirement if it is “placed in a medium such that it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium.”100 For example, the audiovisual effects video games generate
meet the embodiment requirement—despite the games creating
“new” images each time one plays them101—because they are “permanently embodied in a material object, the memory devices, from which
[they] can be perceived with the aid of the other components of the
game.”102 A work satisfies the duration requirement if it remains embodied in a medium for “more than [a] transitory duration,” i.e., at

94. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 101.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (“A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been
fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work
has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”).
99. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008).
100. Id.
101. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982).
102. Id. (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d Cir.
1982)).
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least more than a few seconds.103 “Writing a work on paper or on a
computer hard drive, recording a work on tape, and sculpting a work
out of marble (or ice!) all satisfy this requirement [of being fixed]. An
unrecorded improvisation . . . would not satisfy this requirement.”104
4. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Section 102(b) prohibits an author from receiving copyright protection for “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”105 This
provision codified the common law principle known as the “idea/expression dichotomy.”106 The idea/expression dichotomy first appeared in the seminal case Baker v. Selden.107
In Baker, “the plaintiff Selden wrote and obtained copyrights on
a series of books setting out a new system of bookkeeping.”108 The
books described the plaintiff’s bookkeeping system and included various forms “with ruled lines and headings” for use in his system.109
Defendant Baker published account books that utilized forms similar
to those included in the plaintiff’s books, and the plaintiff subsequently filed suit for copyright infringement.110 He alleged that the
“ruled lines and headings, given to illustrate the system, are a part of
the book” and that accordingly “no one can make or use similar ruled
lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on
substantially the same system, without violating the copyright.”111
On appeal, the Supreme Court faced the question of “whether the
exclusive property in a system of book-keeping can be claimed, under
the law of copyright, by means of a book in which that system is explained?”112 It ultimately concluded that the “copyright of a book on
book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use
103. See Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 128–29; see also Advanced Comput.
Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“[I]f a computer is turned off within seconds or fractions of a second of the [software] loading,
the resulting RAM representation of the program would be too ephemeral to be considered ‘fixed’ or a ‘copy’ under the [Copyright] Act.”).
104. Copyright Basics, supra note 81.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
106. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
107. Id. at 1355 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879)).
108. Id. (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 100).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 101).
112. Baker, 101 U.S. at 101.
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account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.”113 The
Court, comparing the work at issue to “a work on mathematical science,” declared that “copyright . . . cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds.”114 The
Court noted that although copyright protects the plaintiff’s particular
explanation or description of his bookkeeping system, “it does not
prevent others from using the system described therein.”115 The Court
further found that “if it is necessary to use the forms Selden included
in his books to make use of the accounting system, that use would not
amount to copyright infringement.”116
Since Baker, courts have routinely held that “copyright protects
only an author’s expression of an idea and not the idea itself.”117 An
author accordingly may not copyright the idea of a knight saving a
damsel in distress; she may only copyright her own expression of, or
“take” on, that idea. The idea/expression dichotomy also prevents authors from copyrighting historical facts and the theories in which they
are used.118 “Expression makes the idea unique, specific, and therefore
the property of its creator.”119
Although the doctrine is clear in its intent to leave facts, theories,
and the like to the public domain,120 distinguishing an idea from expression can be deceptively difficult. Section 101 unhelpfully excluded
“idea” and “expression” from its enumerated definitions.121 Congress
intentionally left it to the courts to draw the line between idea and
expression: “Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope
of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate
113. Id. at 104.
114. Id. at 103.
115. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355 (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 104).
116. Id.
117. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954)).
118. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.
1980) (“[T]he scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing
no more than the author’s original expression of particular facts and theories already
in the public domain.”).
119. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1290 (2003).
120. “The term ‘public domain’ refers to creative materials that are not protected
by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public
owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain
work without obtaining permission.” Welcome to the Public Domain, COPYRIGHT & FAIR
USE: STAN. U. LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/
[https://perma.cc/4N3E-FU3S].
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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. . . that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.”122 Difficulty distinguishing idea from expression might
arise where a work blends fact and fiction or where it incorporates a
narrow idea that can only be expressed in a limited number of ways.
In the latter case, the idea and expression merge, and expression of
the narrow idea is uncopyrightable.123
In the former case, or where expression is simply difficult to discern from the underlying idea, courts may employ an abstraction test
pioneered by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.124 Although initially applied to determine whether a movie infringed the copyright of a similarly themed play, the test is useful to
determine the boundary between idea and expression:
Upon any work, . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.125

The test essentially instructs the factfinder to envision a work of authorship as a series of layers of abstraction. An idea underlies each
work; it is the foundation of that work. The topmost layer is the literal
text of a work; such text represents the author’s expression. In between these two layers are paraphrases and summaries of the work.
The courts and factfinders are charged with determining which layer
separates expression from idea and granting copyright protection
only to those works (or elements of works) constituting expression.126
BCI-encoded brain signals can hypothetically satisfy the four
basic statutory requirements for copyright protection. Brain signals
representing creative, original expression are potentially protectable

122. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5670.
123. This principle is called the “merger doctrine.” Welcome to the Public Domain,
supra note 120; see also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.
1967) (“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic
necessarily requires,’ if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number,
to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541
(1st Cir. 1905)).
124. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
125. Id.
126. Id. (“In such cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression
and what is expressed.”).
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as “literary works” the moment they are decoded and fixed to a device
in a machine-readable format.
C. HISTORY OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT
The American copyright system is predicated on theories of (1)
utilitarianism and (2) moral right. Although the former theory predominates American justifications for copyright protection,127 the U.S.
Copyright Office has recognized that elements of the latter theory,
which predominates European justifications for copyright protection,128 form at least a partial basis for certain protections in the U.S.
copyright system.129 A grant of copyright protection to BCI-encoded
brain signals—or any work of authorship—should accord with and
advance the goals of the underlying theories supporting the U.S. copyright regime.
1. Utilitarianism
“[U]tilitarianism is the dominant purpose of American copyright
law.”130 Indeed, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (the “Intellectual Property
Clause”) of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact copyright
legislation “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”131 Copyright protection fulfills this purpose by “provid[ing] the incentive of exclusive
rights for a limited duration to authors to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.”132 According to the utilitarian theory, “[w]ithout this incentive, . . . authors might not invest the time, energy, and
money necessary to create these works because they might be copied
cheaply and easily by free riders, eliminating authors’ ability to profit
from their works.”133
The Founding Fathers were not the first to provide copyright protection on a utilitarian basis. The Statute of Anne134—predating the
127. See infra Part I.C.1.
128. See infra Part I.C.2.
129. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING
MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2019) (“The Copyright Office believes that the
U.S. moral rights patchwork continues to provide important [copyright] protections . . . .”).
130. Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71,
74 (2014).
131. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
132. Fromer, supra note 130.
133. Id. at 74–75.
134. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21 (Gr. Brit.).
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American Revolution by sixty-seven years—“vest[ed] the Copies of
printed Books in the authors . . . for the Encouragement of learned
Men to compose and write useful Books.”135 The Founders undoubtedly looked to this statute while developing America’s constitutional
basis for copyright protection.136 In fact, writing to the president of the
Continental Congress in 1783, American poet and diplomat Joel Barlow petitioned for Congress to pass a statute similar to the Statute of
Anne, arguing that without such a statute, “we are not to expect to see
any works of considerable magnitude, (which must always be works
of time & labor), offered to the Public till such security is given.”137 The
Continental Congress listened; just as the Statute of Anne granted authors a twenty-one-year exclusive right to print “Books already
printed” and a fourteen-year exclusive right to print “Books already
composed and not printed and published,”138 the Founders included
in the Constitution a clause empowering Congress to grant a limited
monopoly to the author of a work.139 James Madison later stated that
“[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right
of common law;”140 and so our Founders adjudged copyright to be a
utilitarian tool in America as well.
The judiciary is, of course, acutely aware of the Constitution’s
utilitarian basis for copyright protection, and it frequently invokes the
Intellectual Property Clause to rationalize its decisions. In Mazer v.
Stein, for example, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the utilitarian philosophy underlying American copyright doctrine to explain
in part its decision to find a useful article141 copyrightable:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days
135. Id.
136. See Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited
Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 1429–30
(2010) (“The early American statutory framework closely followed the Statute of
Anne, and for a long period of time, it appeared to change relatively little.”).
137. Letter from Joel Barlow to the President of the Continental Congress (1783),
in 4 PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 369, 371 (1789).
138. 8 Ann. c. 21.
139. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (detailing the duration of copyright protection a work may receive).
140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 220 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
141. “A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101.
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devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered.142

Courts and Congress should always consider the constitutionally prescribed utilitarian basis for copyright when deciding whether a work
is copyrightable.
2. Moral Right
Utilitarianism, however, is not the universal basis for granting
copyright protection. The predominant justification for copyright in
Europe, for example, is founded on a philosophy of natural rights,143
and associated with this philosophy are particular moral rights.144
Moral rights are “certain non-economic rights that are considered personal to an author.”145 Among these rights are “the right of an author
to be credited as the author of their work (the right of attribution), and
the right of an author to prevent prejudicial distortions of their work
(the right of integrity).”146 The theory of moral right protects such interests because, according to its proponents, an author’s work is more
than just that; it is “‘his spiritual child’ . . . an outgrowth of his soul.”147
As such, it is worthy of protection.
Modern moral right justifications for copyright largely originated
in the teachings of Hegel and Kant.148 According to Kant, “[i]f something is internal to the person, such as one’s body parts or personality,
it cannot be alienated.”149 Thus, in Kant’s view, an author’s “words are
a continuing expression of his inner self,” part and parcel to his very
person.150 Kant therefore believed an author’s right to communicate
his expression and right to contract for its dissemination were inalienable personal rights.151 Thus, assuming a Kantian view of authorship,
works are not only worthy of protection from, inter alia, distortion
142. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
143. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 119, at 1285.
144. Id. at 1300–01.
145. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 129, at 6.
146. Id.
147. Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 35 (1997).
148. Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.
1039, 1041.
149. Neil W. Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and Enhancement of Author
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 359 (1993).
150. Id. at 374.
151. Id. at 374–76; see also id. at 359–60 (“Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property . . . . [I]t is impossible to be a person
and a thing, the proprietor and the property.”) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
ETHICS 165 (L. Infield trans., J. MacMurray rev. ed., 1930)).
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and misattribution, but title and rights to those works are also inalienable as a part of an economic transaction.152 Hegel built on Kant’s position but diverged in one significant way: Hegel believed that while
an author’s mental processes were a part of the self, the right to reproduce the results of those processes was alienable and subject to
economic transaction.153
Although “[t]he fundamental overriding purpose of United States
copyright law is social utility[,]”154 Congress has passed legislation
that bears the mark of moral right justification.155 The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) protects an artist’s “rights of attribution”
and “integrity.”156 The rights that VARA protects mirror those protected by the internationally adopted Berne Treaty, which the United
States adopted in 1989.157 Legislators and judges therefore may support their decisions as to whether a work is copyrightable with references to moral right as embodied in the Berne Treaty and VARA.158
Part I, through an examination of BCI mechanics and American
copyright’s basic requirements, history, and philosophical underpinnings, ultimately suggests that BCI-encoded brain signals might qualify for copyright protection. Part II demonstrates that although sufficiently original BCI-encoded brain signals qualify as copyrightable

152. Id. at 374–76.
153. See id. at 377; see also GEORGE W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 52 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1821) (“The reason I can alienate my property is that
it is mine only in so far as I put my will into it. Hence I may abandon . . . anything that I
have or yield it to the will of another and so into his possession, provided always that
the thing in question is a thing external by nature.”).
154. Netanel, supra note 149, at 365.
155. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)).
156. Id.
157. Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION art. 6bis, July 24, 1971, 102 Stat.
2853,(“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”),
with § 106(a) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the right . . . to claim
authorship of that work, and . . . shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”).
158. Such reliance on moral right may be permissible because “solicitude for, and
sometimes protection of, creators’ moral-rights interests can strengthen utilitarian incentives in copyright.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property,
98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1763 (2012).
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“expression,”159 a grant of copyright protection to works composed of
such signals does not advance copyright’s utilitarian goals.160 Part II
additionally illustrates practical problems that may arise if Congress
deems BCI-encoded brain signals copyrightable.161
II. BCI-ENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS LEGALLY QUALIFY FOR
COPYRIGHT BUT DO NOT ADVANCE COPYRIGHT’S GOALS
As discussed in Part I, sufficiently original BCI-encoded brain signals ostensibly qualify for copyright protection by the letter of the U.S.
Constitution and the Copyright Act of 1976.162 But like the photographic technology addressed in Burrow-Giles,163 whether the U.S.
Constitution or the Copyright Act of 1976 contemplates granting copyright protection to BCI-encoded brain signals is a question “not free
from difficulty.”164 Indeed, “the scientific principle on which [BCI technology] rests, and the chemicals and machinery by which it is operated, have all been discovered long since the statute [and Constitution] w[ere] enacted.”165 The fact that BCI will—for the first time in
human history—permit individuals to circumvent the motor cortex
during the formation of creative expression renders the question of
copyrightability peculiarly difficult to answer.166 Indeed, BCI-encoded
brain signals blur the line between mere thought and traditional, copyrightable expression. Section A of this Part investigates whether BCIencoded brain signals constitute expression under any constitutionally or commonly permissible construction of the word. Section B considers whether a grant of copyright protection to BCI-encoded brain
signals accords with the justification for—and advances the goals of—
U.S. copyright doctrine. Section C details the practical problems that
arise from a determination of copyrightability for BCI-encoded brain
signals. For the purpose of the analyses furnished in this Part, this
Note assumes that BCIs (1) capture and encode brain signals instantaneously and (2) possess virtually limitless storage capacity.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
See supra notes 3–14 and accompanying text.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884).
Id. at 58.
See supra Part I.A.
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A. BCI-ENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS QUALIFY AS “EXPRESSION”
The Copyright Act of 1976 exclusively grants copyright protection “to the expression of an idea—not the idea itself.”167 Despite the
axiomatic nature of the idea/expression dichotomy in U.S. copyright
doctrine,168 “courts and commentators . . . [have] never define[d] or
clarif[ied] what exactly they mean by the terms ‘idea’ and ‘expression.’”169 But the advent of BCI technology and an entirely novel, artificial alternative to traditional avenues of “expression” necessitates a
more precise construction of the word and its essential components.
Scrutiny of several sources ultimately reveals that, under most constructions of the word, BCI-encoded brain signals are expression.
1. Common Construction
United States courts have increasingly consulted dictionaries to
determine the ordinary meaning of undefined statutory language; dictionaries therefore have become authoritative sources on the common construction of words.170 Because the Constitution and the Copyright Act of 1976 fail to define “expression,” dictionaries offer a
reliable definition of the term.171 Merriam-Webster primarily defines
“expression” as “an act, process, or instance of representing in a medium.”172 BCI-encoded brain signals qualify as “expression” under this
definition. Brain signal acquisition, translation, and routing together
undoubtedly constitute a “process.”173 Because this process acquires
brain signals representing creative thought, digitizes them, and stores
those digitized, machine-readable signals on an external digital device174 (i.e., a medium175), BCI-encoded brain signals constitute “expression” according to Merriam-Webster’s definition.
Black’s Law Dictionary alternatively defines “expression” as
“[w]ritings, speech, or actions that show a person’s ideas, thoughts,
167. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see also supra Part I.B.4.
168. Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,
10 PACE L. REV. 551, 563 (1990).
169. Id. at 565.
170. See Pamela Hobbs, Defining the Law: (Mis)using the Dictionary to Decide Cases,
13 DISCOURSE STUD. 327, 330 (2011).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 101.
172. Expression, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expression [https://perma.cc/FF3K-D5EF].
173. See Shih et al. supra note 29, at 270–72 (describing BCI systems as a series of
processes).
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (indicating that digital devices qualify as tangible mediums of expression).
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emotions, or opinions.”176 BCI-encoded brain signals are neither
“speech” nor “actions.” They do, however, represent creative
“thoughts.” Whether BCI-encoded brain signals constitute “expression” under this definition therefore turns on whether the encoded
signals are “writings.” A “writing,” according to Black’s, is
[a]ny intentional recording of words in a visual form, whether in handwriting, printing, typewriting, or any other tangible form that may be viewed or
heard with or without mechanical aids. . . . This includes . . . electronic documents on computer media . . . and any other media on which words can be
recorded.177

Whether BCI-encoded brain signals qualify as “writings”—and
consequently “expression”—under Black’s definition depends upon
the realities and limitations of BCI technology. Thought encoded by a
BCI that passively captures SMRs (or antecedent signals) likely would
not qualify as “writings” because, although the user could render the
resulting recording in a visual form with mechanical aid, the recording
itself would not have been intentional. Conversely, thoughts encoded
by a BCI that captures brain signals at the command of the user would
be intentional recordings and, therefore, “writings” as such. BCI-encoded brain signals accordingly qualify as “expression” under Black’s
more narrow definition only if the BCI encodes brain signals at the deliberate command of the user.
2. Constitutional Construction
Although the Constitution does not explicitly address—much less
define—“expression” in the copyright context, it undoubtedly provides the basis for protection of “expression” rather than “ideas.” According to the Supreme Court, “copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author’s expression.”178 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony also makes clear that “writings,” as referenced and made protectable in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,179 are “the
literary productions of . . . authors, . . . includ[ing] all forms of writing,
printing, engravings, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the
author are given visible expression.”180 Although the Constitution itself
176. Expression, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
177. Writing, id.
178. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
179. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
180. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (emphasis added).

2020]

EFFORTLESS EXPRESSION

413

does not define “expression” in any context, one may accordingly deduce a construction of “expression” from judicial treatment and interpretation of the Constitution.
Because U.S. copyright law is constitutionally related to First
Amendment protections, one may apply a First Amendment definition
of “expression” in the copyright context. The First Amendment demands that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”181 Courts routinely and collectively refer to
these freedoms as the “freedom of expression.”182 Although “expression” in the First Amendment context explicitly encompasses “speech”
and products of “the press,” “[t]he Supreme Court ‘has long recognized
that [First Amendment] protection does not end at the spoken or written word,’ but rather extends to other forms of expression.”183 The Supreme Court has made clear that other conduct—i.e., not speech or
writing per se—becomes expressive when it conveys a message:
If there were no reason for a group of people to march from here to there
except to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing
any message beyond the fact of the march itself. . . . Real “[p]arades are public
dramas of social relations, and in them . . . ideas are available for communication and consideration.” . . . Parades are thus a form of expression, not just
motion . . . .184

When conduct communicates a message or an idea, it is “expression”
within the First Amendment meaning of the word. Although conduct
must overcome a heightened bar to qualify for First Amendment protection,185 any conduct that is minimally communicative at least qualifies as “expression.” BCI-encoded brain signals easily qualify as “expression” under this First Amendment definition of the term.
Although the BCI-encoded brain signals would manifest in a digitized,
machine-readable form,186 they are “expression” under a First
181. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
182. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The general
proposition that freedom of expression . . . is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions.”).
183. Margaret L. Mettler, Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argument for Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 262 (2012)
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
184. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568
(1995) (quoting SUSAN DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)).
185. See Mettler, supra note 183 (“Not all conduct that is minimally expressive receives First Amendment protection, however. . . . Under the Spence test, there must
first be ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message’ and second, a great likelihood
‘that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam))).
186. See supra Part I.A.
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Amendment construction so long as they communicate some message.187
Although the Constitution does not define “expression” in the
copyright context, judicial interpretation of the Intellectual Property
Clause’s reference to “writings” explicitly incorporates “expression.”188 The oft-quoted Burrow-Giles definition of “writings”189 indicates that any “visible embodiment of an idea” constitutes “expression.”190 The decision in Stowe v. Thomas, which contrasts
unprotectable ideas and protectable expression, supports this construction:
The claim of literary property . . . cannot be in the ideas, sentiments, or the
creations of the imagination of the poet or novelist as dissevered from the
language, idiom, style, or the outward semblance and exhibition of them. His
exclusive property in the creation of his mind, cannot be vested in the author
as abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and
the language in which he has clothed them. When he has sold his book, the
only property which [h]e reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him,
is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of
characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed.191

BCI-encoded brain signals easily fit within this constitutionally derived definition of “expression”—i.e., the visible embodiment of an
embellished idea. So long as BCI-encoded brain signals satisfy copyright’s basic requirements,192 they qualify as “expression” under this
definition.
Common and constitutional constructions of “expression” are liberal in their scope. Despite the fact that BCI technology creates an entirely novel avenue through which thoughts manifest in a physical
form, these constructions qualify BCI-encoded thoughts as “expression” in both lay and constitutional contexts.
B. AMERICAN COPYRIGHT’S RAISON D’ÊTRE DOES NOT JUSTIFY
COPYRIGHTING BCI-ENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS
Although BCI-encoded brain signals ostensibly qualify as expression capable of satisfying the fundamental requirements necessary for
187. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445–46 (2d Cir.
2001) (“If someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using
strings of 1’s and 0’s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be no different for constitutional purposes than if it had been written in English.”).
188. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
190. See Jones, supra note 168, at 554.
191. 23 F. Cas. 201, 206–07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (emphasis added).
192. See supra Part I.B.
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copyright protection,193 the American copyright system’s raison
d’être194 does not justify a grant of copyright protection to such signals. Copyright in the United States predominantly rests upon a utilitarian foundation.195 Congress grants the exclusive rights associated
with copyright196 to authors because, “[w]ithout this incentive, . . . authors might not invest the time, energy, and money necessary to create [culturally valuable] works because they might be copied cheaply
and easily by free riders . . . .”197 Sara Stadler effectively illustrates the
problem that U.S. copyright seeks to prevent:
[C]opyright law protect[s] authors of printed works from the harm caused by
those who would print and market copies that were interchangeable with the
corresponding “originals.” Without such protection, unauthorized copies . . .
could be reproduced and distributed to the public in the same form as authorized ones. Because [consumers] would assign a roughly equal value to
the authorized and unauthorized copies, readers would purchase the
cheaper of the two, which, in turn, would lower prices across the board, thus
decreasing the profits that otherwise would be enjoyed by the copyright
owner. This decrease, in turn, would reduce the incentive to create, thus reducing utility as well.198

The utilitarian framework therefore assumes: (1) the cost of creating
a new work is high; (2) the cost of reproducing that work is low; (3)
reproducing that work does not exhaust it in any way; and (4) by
granting the author the exclusive rights associated with copyright, she
will be able to exclude others from her work and accordingly recoup
her investment in the creation of the work.199
BCI technology undermines at least one assumption underlying
the utilitarian justification—namely, that the cost of creating a new
work is high. The economic costs of creating a copyrightable work—
193. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.
194. See supra Part I.C.1.
195. See supra Part I.C.1; Fromer, supra note 130, at 74. Because utilitarianism
dominates American copyright law, this Note only briefly considers BCI-encoded brain
signals in a moral right environment. The theory of moral right, unlike the utilitarian
basis for copyright, suggests that the author of a work reserves certain non-economic
rights because her work actually expresses her personality. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra
note 129, at 6. A copyright system rooted in Kantian principles undoubtedly grants
copyright protection to BCI-encoded brain signals because nothing is more “internal
to the person” than their thoughts, and a Hegelian system would also likely protect
BCI-encoded brain signals—albeit more narrowly—for the same reason. See supra
Part I.C.2.
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
197. Fromer, supra note 130, at 74–75.
198. Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 633–
34 (2006) (footnote omitted).
199. See JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN A. O’ROURKE,
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 6 (2015).
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i.e., the “cost of expression”—has two components: (1) “the cost of creating the work,” which primarily consists of the time and effort an author invests during the creative process; and (2) the cost of manufacturing copies of the work.200 The production of traditional works of
authorship undoubtedly requires some degree of both intellectual and
physical effort, and whether the production of copies incurs manufacturing costs depends on whether those copies are digital (relatively
low cost) or analog (relatively high cost).201
BCI technology, however, circumvents the physical effort requirement of creation entirely when it circumvents the motor cortex
during the capture and codification of brain signals representing creative thought.202 In addition, because BCI-encoded brain signals are
fixed to, readable by, and reproduced through a digital device,203 the
cost of manufacturing copies of the encoded signals is low. The “cost
of expression” connected with the creation of BCI-encoded brain signals consists almost exclusively of intellectual labor and, therefore, is
remarkably low.
Given the low cost of creating BCI-encoded brain signals, the utilitarian calculus that supports a grant of copyrightability for sufficiently original works of authorship appears not to support a grant of
copyrightability to BCI-encoded brain signals. In other words, the
“cost of expression” one must invest to create a work through BCI-encoding is sufficiently low such that granting copyright protection to
BCI-encoded thoughts would not be “commensurate with the services
rendered.”204 Because copyright enforcement is costly, the costs of
granting copyright protection to BCI-encoded brain signals outweighs
the social and economic benefits derived from such copyright protection.205 Indeed, although not all thoughts are created equal, the brain

200. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326–27 (1989).
201. Because BCI-encoded brain signals are recorded on a digital device, this Note
assumes that copying such signals would mirror copying software or other digital files
and therefore require little effort on behalf of the copyist. See, e.g., Sudip Bhattacharjee,
Ram D. Gopal & Lawrence G. Sanders, Digital Music and Online Sharing: Software Piracy
2.0?, 46 COMMC’NS ACM 107, 107 (2003) (“Rapid advances in Internet connectivity and
digital compression technologies have dramatically increased online sharing of digitized material . . . . With decreasing data storage cost and higher bandwidth, users are
able to send large collections of [digitized goods] via email.”).
202. See supra Part I.A.1.
203. See supra Part I.A.1.
204. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
205. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 200, at 331 (explaining that legal rights, particularly with regard to intangibles, are costly to enforce).
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constantly produces the signals that constitute thought.206 Some researchers even argue that unconscious thoughts are more important
to the creative process than their conscious counterparts.207 A statutory incentive to think (i.e., to create in a BCI context) therefore appears to be unnecessary because thinking constantly occurs. A utilitarian approach to copyright therefore does not support granting
copyrightable status to BCI-encoded brain signals even if those signals
satisfy the basic requirements of copyrightability.208
C. COPYRIGHTING BCI-ENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS POSES PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS
A determination that BCI-encoded brain signals are copyrightable will undoubtedly raise practical problems. Although potential
problems abound, this Note specifically addresses issues related to (1)
judicial resources and (2) determinability.209
1. Judicial Resources
Because an original work of authorship is created—and therefore
protected210—the moment it is fixed to a tangible medium of expression,211 a person using a BCI could potentially create a limitless number of copyrightable works. Indeed, if a BCI passively captures and encodes brain signals representing distinct creative thoughts, each
distinct creative thought is potentially copyrightable.212 If ownership
and use of BCIs were to become ubiquitous—like the ownership and
206. See, e.g., Judith N. Mildner & Diana I. Tamir, Spontaneous Thought as an Unconstrained Memory Process, 42 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 763, 763 (2019) (“In our minds,
thoughts unfold continuously and freely.”).
207. See, e.g., Ap Dijksterhuis & Loran F. Nordgren, A Theory of Unconscious
Thought, 1 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 95, 102 (2006) (“Some necessary conscious activity
notwithstanding, it is, in most people’s view, the unconscious that produces truly creative or unique thoughts.”).
208. See supra Part I.B.
209. Other practical problems this Note does not address include, inter alia, (1)
whether an employee’s brain signals captured during employment belong to her employer under the work-for-hire doctrine; and (2) whether brain signals representing
thoughts related to another copyrighted work are derivative works or qualify as fair
use. These questions deserve (or require) their own articles.
210. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work . . . subsists from its creation . . . .”).
211. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
212. “[F]ragmentary words and phrases,” however, will not qualify for copyright
protection. CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir.
1996) (“It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection to ‘fragmentary words and
phrases’ . . . on the grounds that these materials do not exhibit the minimal level of
creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection.” (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01(b)(3))).
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use of smartphones today213—the populace would create a virtually
infinite number of copyrightable works of authorship daily. A steep
rise in the creation and dissemination of user-generated images—i.e.,
potentially copyrightable works of authorship—undoubtedly followed the arrival of social media.214 Surely, then, the emergence of a
technology that permits an author to create copyrightable works
merely by thinking will result in an even more dramatic increase in
the number of copyrightable works created daily.
A technology that transforms laypeople to prolific authors could
prove problematic for the U.S. Copyright Office215 and courts. First, although an author need not register her work for copyright protection
to subsist, she does need to register it to commence an action for infringement.216 If BCI-encoded brain signals are copyrightable, the U.S.
Copyright Office and U.S. courts might see an unwieldy increase in registration applications and infringement actions, respectively. This increased activity is problematic for both bodies. For courts, the judicial
resources necessary for any litigation are undeniably scarce.217 An obligation to entertain copyright infringement cases—which are expensive and lengthy proceedings218—for an immeasurable body of
213. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/JK33-8RL8] (“The share of Americans that own smartphones is now 81%, up from just 35% in Pew Research Center’s
first survey of smartphone ownership conducted in 2011.”).
214. See Elizabeth J. Tao, Note, A Picture’s Worth: The Future of Copyright Protection of User-Generated Images on Social Media, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 617, 618
(2017) (“Social media users are posting photographs online in extraordinary quantities. As the amount of user content on social media websites increases, a large number
of copyrightable photographs are readily accessible and ripe for unauthorized copying . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
215. Cf. Overview of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/F67X-4RU5] (“[T]he Copyright Office is responsible for administering a complex and dynamic set of laws, which include registration,
the recordation of title and licenses, a number of statutory licensing provisions, and
other aspects of the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.”).
216. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 1, COPYRIGHT BASICS 4 (2019) (“Copyright exists
automatically in an original work of authorship once it is fixed in a tangible medium,
but . . . for U.S. works, registration . . . is necessary to enforce the exclusive rights of
copyright through litigation.”).
217. See Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 401, 405 & n.21 (2013).
218. See Scott Alan Burroughs, Copyright Litigation: Now More Expensive and with
More Delay than Ever Before!, ABOVE L. (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://
abovethelaw.com/2019/03/copyright-litigation-now-more-expensive-and-with
-more-delay-than-ever-before/ [https://perma.cc/2GM4-HSER].
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copyrighted works would threaten the courts’ very functionality. Regarding the U.S. Copyright Office, its backlog of copyright registration
applications exceeded 250,000 at the beginning of 2018.219 If BCI-encoded brain signals are copyrightable, the U.S. Copyright office could
potentially confront a spike in registration applications and, consequently, growth of its backlog.
2. Determinability
BCI-encoded brain signals, although they may qualify for copyright protection, might suffer from issues of determinability. “Given
the physical complexity of what’s happening inside your head, it’s not
easy to trace a thought from beginning to end.”220 In other words, determining which BCI-encoded brain signals form the copyrightable expression is “a little like asking where the forest begins. Is it with the
first leaf, or the tip of the first root?”221 Although a sufficiently original,
encoded combination of brain signals purportedly representing a distinct thought (or stream of consciousness) would be copyrightable,
courts—and even authors—might struggle to determine which encoded signals form the copyrightable expression.
These determinability issues would arise from (1) neuronal
noise222 and (2) spontaneous thought. Neuronal noise, in a BCI context, might render imprecise the digital output of encoded brain signals. For example, where a BCI captures and encodes brain signals
representing the phrase “I like dogs,” the neuronal noise within those
signals might “contaminate” the phrase such that the phrase no longer
reads as “I like dogs”; rather, in its raw digital form, the BCI output
might read as “I[jdh] li[ahfhd]k[nf]e do[h]g[h]s.”223
Even if a BCI is sophisticated enough to read through neuronal
noise, spontaneous thought—as opposed to random neuronal fluctuations and disturbances—often infiltrates and interrupts an otherwise concerted stream of consciousness.224 Spontaneous thought is
219. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018, at 6 (2018) https://
www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KBT
-JK6F].
220. Elizabeth Dougherty, What Are Thoughts Made of?, MASS. INST. TECH. SCH.
ENG’G: ASK AN ENG’R (Apr. 26, 2011), https://engineering.mit.edu/engage/ask-an-engineer/what-are-thoughts-made-of/ [https://perma.cc/DLH3-NYS7].
221. Id.
222. See Faisal et al., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
223. The bracketed nonsense represents the “random neuronal fluctuations” that
are present but not part of a signal.
224. See Matthew A. Killingsworth & Daniel T. Gilbert, A Wandering Mind Is an Unhappy Mind, 330 SCI. 932, 932 (2010).
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“all thought that unfolds effortlessly and unrestrictedly. . . . It includes
concepts such as mind wandering, daydreaming, creativity, and
dreaming.”225 One study reported that mind wandering—i.e., “stimulus-independent thought”226—occurred in 46.9% of study participants.227 The researchers posited that mind wandering is “the brain’s
default mode of operation.”228 In addition to being the brain’s default
mode of operation, mind wandering “is often experienced intermittently during sustained attention tasks.”229 In a BCI context, encoded
brain signals representing concerted creative thought might be interrupted by spontaneous thought (like mind wandering). Returning to
the example phrase immediately above, where a BCI captures and encodes brain signals representing the phrase “I like dogs,” that BCI
would also capture the signals representing spontaneous thought
such that the BCI’s output might read “I like [what’s for dinner?]
dogs.”230 Neuronal noise and spontaneous thought therefore pose a
practical problem in the identification of copyrightable elements
within BCI-encoded brain signals.
Although BCI-encoded brain signals qualify as copyrightable “expression” under lay and constitutional constructions of the word, a
grant of copyright protection to works composed of such signals does
not advance copyright’s utilitarian objectives and poses potentially
significant practical problems.231 Part III demonstrates that Congress
could simultaneously harmonize theoretical discord and reduce the
practical consequences arising from a grant of copyrightable status to
225. Mildner & Tamir, supra note 206, at 764.
226. Killingsworth & Gilbert, supra note 224.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Wendy Hasenkamp, Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall, Erica Duncan & Lawrence W. Barsalou, Mind Wandering and Attention During Focused Meditation: A FineGrained Temporal Analysis of Fluctuating Cognitive States, 59 NEUROIMAGE 750, 750
(2012).
230. The bracketed language here represents a spontaneous thought interfering
with the concerted thought. Spontaneous thoughts that amount to more than “fragmentary words or phrases” may independently qualify for copyright protection and
further compound the problem of judicial resources described in Part II.C.1, supra. See
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (“It is
clear . . . that nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly unique or novel. . . . A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock
caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having
hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the ‘author’ may adopt it as his and copyright
it.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see also CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast
Props., Inc., 97 f.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir. 1996) (describing limitations on the copyrightability of “fragmentary words and phrases”).
231. See supra Part II.B.
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BCI-encoded brain signals by imposing an effort requirement on authors seeking to protect works of authorship composed of these signals.
III. BCI-ENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS SHOULD NOT BE
COPYRIGHTABLE UNLESS CONGRESS INTRODUCES AN EFFORT
REQUIREMENT
Although BCI-encoded brain signals constitute expression232 and
are likely copyrightable by the letter of the law,233 granting protection
to these signals does not advance the utilitarian goals of the U.S. copyright system,234 and such signals therefore should not be protectable
under contemporary copyright law. Congress, however, could institute an exceptional effort requirement that would raise the “cost of
expression” of BCI-encoded brain signals and consequently render
them copyrightable in a utilitarian framework. An effort requirement
would also solve the practical problems described supra in Part II.C.
A. AN EFFORT REQUIREMENT IS NECESSARY TO RENDER BCI-ENCODED
BRAIN SIGNALS CONSTITUTIONALLY COPYRIGHTABLE
Despite satisfying the basic statutory requirements for copyright
protection, BCI-encoded brain signals should not be copyrightable because copyrighting such signals would not achieve the utilitarian objectives235 of U.S. copyright law. U.S. copyright doctrine is founded on
the idea that granting exclusive rights to authors of works will (1) incentivize them to create more works of authorship and (2) enable
them to recoup their investments in the creation of works. This utilitarian framework assumes that the “cost of expression”236 required to
create a work of authorship is sufficiently high such that an author will
cease to produce additional works unless she receives an incentive to
create—namely, copyright protection for the works she authored.237
The cost of expression of creating BCI-encoded brain signals,
however, consists only of intellectual labor, and that intellectual labor—i.e., thinking—occurs ceaselessly.238 The cost of expression an
author pays to create BCI-encoded brain signals therefore is not

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Parts I.B, II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 200.
See supra Part I.C.2, II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
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sufficiently higher than the cost a copyist incurs to reproduce the
work,239 and so the utilitarian framework of U.S. copyright does not
support a grant of copyright protection to BCI-encoded brain signals
despite their satisfaction of the Copyright Act of 1976’s basic requirements.240 In any event, common sense dictates that humans should
not receive an incentive to think.
Congress, acting in its capacity to pass laws that advance the utilitarian objectives of the Intellectual Property Clause,241 could amend
the Copyright Act of 1976 to include an effort requirement—applicable only to BCI-encoded brain signals—that would oblige authors to
“polish” their raw BCI-encoded brain signals before such signals qualify for copyright protection. Such a requirement would obligate the
authors of BCI-encoded brain signals (1) to remove manually the neuronal noise and spontaneous thoughts242 captured alongside the heart
of their intended expression and (2) to identify the beginning and end
of the distinct encoded brain signals they wish to copyright. Only after
the author has “edited” her BCI-encoded brain signals would the signals qualify for copyright.243
This proposed effort requirement brings BCI-encoded brain signals within the constitutional confines of copyrightability because it
increases the time and effort an author must invest in the creative process—thereby increasing the cost of expression244—before her BCIencoded thoughts are statutorily copyrightable. The resulting cost of
expression associated with producing polished, copyrightable BCI-encoded brain signals would warrant a grant of copyright because—as
the utilitarian framework assumes and has been true of traditional
works of authorship—the cost of creating the BCI-encoded brain signals would become higher than the cost a copyist would incur to reproduce digitally the encoded signals. The author accordingly would
be entitled to the exclusive rights of copyright to encourage her to continue producing and to recoup the statutorily required investment associated with her culturally valuable, polished BCI-encoded brain signals.245
239. See supra note 200.
240. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.B.
241. See W. Michael Schuster, Public Choice Theory, the Constitution, and Public Understanding of the Copyright System, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2247, 2253 (2018).
242. See supra Part II.C.2.
243. In practice, an author might “edit” her work by removing from the work the
machine or human-readable code representing neuronal noise and spontaneous
thought.
244. See Landes & Posner, supra note 200 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Parts I.C.1, II.B.
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B. AN EFFORT REQUIREMENT REMEDIES THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS BCIENCODED BRAIN SIGNALS POSE
This proposed effort requirement also solves the practical problems detailed above.246 First, the effort requirement cures the issue of
limited judicial resources.247 Because the requirement would condition the copyrightability of BCI-encoded brain signals on the investment of a concerted editorial effort, the incessant production of copyrightable works of authorship would come to a halt. Although the
production of raw BCI-encoded brain signals would remain incessant,
the production of polished, statutorily copyrightable brain signals
would be far more limited. Indeed, not everyone who thinks is compelled to invest time or effort into transforming their expressive
thoughts into a copyrightable—i.e., registrable and actionable—form.
Although the emergence of a new form of copyrightable expression
might result in an uptick in copyright registrations and related actions, the U.S. Copyright Office and courts could reallocate their resources to address this effect.
Second, the effort requirement obviously cures issues of determinability.248 Indeed, satisfaction of the effort requirement—i.e., the sufficient condition for receiving copyright for BCI-encoded thoughts—
requires a demonstrated effort to cure issues of determinability. As proposed supra, an author who wishes to copyright her BCI-encoded
brain signals must invest the time and effort to remove neuronal noise
and spontaneous thoughts and to indicate where her copyrightable
expression begins and ends.249 The effort requirement therefore implicitly remedies the determinability issues this Note illustrates.
A congressionally authorized effort requirement represents a
practical solution to the issue of copyrightability in the BCI context.
The solution not only brings BCI-encoded brain signals within the utilitarian confines of the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, but
it also eliminates the practical problems that would likely arise if Congress or the judiciary deemed BCI-encoded brain signals copyrightable. Congress might also consider applying this solution to other unorthodox forms of copyrightable expression that require little or no
investment to create. Indeed, as technology continues to evolve, BCI
assuredly will not be the sole challenger to modern (and future) conceptions of expression.
246.
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C. AN EFFORT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE FEIST
Critics of this proposed effort requirement may erroneously argue that it does not accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.250 Prior to Feist, some
courts had embraced a “sweat of the brow” theory of copyright that
“accepts industry and effort as sufficient to establish originality [and
hence copyrightability] even when such effort lacks imagination or
judgment.”251 The Second Circuit crafted “[t]he classic formulation”252
of the “sweat of the brow” theory in Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co.253 The court, finding copyrightable an alphabetical directory of trademarks,254 explained that “[t]he right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation
does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected . . . show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything more than industrious collection.”255 It further declared that where an author “produces by his [physical] labor a
meritorious composition . . . he may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of his work.”256 A copyright regime predicated on a “sweat of the brow” theory therefore eschews originality of content and embraces labor of the author as the
preliminary condition a work of authorship must fulfill to qualify for
copyright protection.257
The Feist Court, however, expressly rejected the “sweat of the
brow” theory advanced in Jeweler’s Circular and any notion that copyright protection merely “was a reward for the hard work” that an author invests in creating a work of authorship.258 The Court, declining
to find copyrightable an alphabetized telephone directory, stated that
although “[t]he ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine had numerous flaws, the
most glaring [was] that it extended copyright protection in a compilation . . . to the facts themselves.”259 The Court importantly noted that
250. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
251. Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 8 (1992).
252. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
253. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
254. Id. at 84–85.
255. Id. at 88.
256. Id.
257. Recall that originality is currently the touchstone of copyrightability. See supra Part I.B.2.
258. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991).
259. Id. at 353.
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“[f]acts are never original, so the . . . author can claim originality, if at
all, only in the way the facts are presented.”260 According to the Court,
“to merit [copyright] protection, the facts must be selected, coordinated, or arranged ‘in such a way’ as to render the work as a whole
original.”261
The Feist Court therefore held that where a work of authorship is
composed solely of uncopyrightable material, the fact that its author
exerted substantial effort to gather the uncopyrightable material embodied in the work does not alone qualify the work for copyright protection. Rather, a work composed of uncopyrightable material becomes copyrightable only after the author “select[s], coordinate[s], or
arrange[s]”262—i.e., edits—the material. And because the “writings
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor,”263 the
Feist Court’s recognition that an author’s selection, coordination, and
arrangement of material may render a work copyrightable demonstrates that selection, coordination, and arrangement are acts of intellectual labor rather than physical labor.
The effort requirement this Note proposes therefore does not violate the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist. The proposed requirement
does not ask authors to invest in a work of authorship the type of physical effort that Feist expressly dismissed as irrelevant in the copyright
context. Rather, because the effort requirement would obligate authors merely to select, coordinate, and arrange their BCI-encoded
brain signals,264 it ensures that an author seeking copyright protection
for those signals invests into the work comprised of those signals an
amount of intellectual labor sufficient to warrant a grant of copyright
protection—just as Feist requires. Feist accordingly does not preclude
the imposition of an effort requirement for authors seeking copyright
protection for a work composed of BCI-encoded brain signals.
Case law, beyond merely permitting Congress to impose an effort
requirement, affirmatively supports the imposition of an effort requirement. In Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc.,265 the estate
of Ernest Hemingway (1) asserted that it possessed a protectable intellectual property right in Hemingway’s oral conversations with author A.E. Hotchner and (2) alleged that Random House, Inc. infringed
Hemingway’s estate’s copyright when it published Hotchner’s
260.
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262.
263.
264.
265.
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Id. (emphasis added).
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accounts of those conversations in a memoir.266 The court—largely
tracking the lower court’s reasoning—declined to recognize any property right in mere oral conversation.267 The court observed that “much
of the literary value of [a] book arises from its author’s selection and
compilation of the conversational materials used, and with his ordering of incidents so as to form a coherent whole.”268 The court, equating
oral conversations to “the raw materials of history,”269 refused to recognize any copyright in mere oral conversation.270
The court, by observing that the fruits of an author’s editorial efforts constitute “much of the literary value” of a work, seems tacitly to
embrace the imposition of an effort requirement.271 The court’s nod
to the value of applied editorial effort and subsequent refusal to grant
copyright protection to mere conversation indicates that some degree
of effort is required to render potentially copyrightable but otherwise
“raw” materials copyrightable. BCI-encoded brain signals—like the
conversational material at issue in Estate of Hemingway—represent
“raw materials” that are ripe for authorial “selection and compilation.”272 Given the issues of determinability from which BCI-encoded
brain signals may suffer,273 a work comprised of such signals would
likely derive significant value from an author’s intellectual efforts to
remove traces of neuronal noise and spontaneous thought.274 The effort requirement would ensure that an author receives copyright for
a coherent work composed of BCI-encoded brain signals rather than a
collection of mere “raw material.” Case law therefore supports—rather than prohibits—the imposition of an effort requirement on BCIencoded brain signals to bring them within the ambit of the U.S. copyright system.
CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to determine whether works produced through
BCI devices could qualify for copyright protection under the Copyright
Act of 1976 and, more importantly, the Constitution itself. This Note
argues that although BCI-encoded brain signals both qualify as
266.
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“expression” and satisfy all the basic requirements necessary to secure copyright protection, granting authors exclusive rights over their
encoded brain signals does not advance the utilitarian objectives of
copyright as mandated by the Constitution. This Note suggests that
Congress could amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to include an effort
requirement that authors of BCI-encoded brain signals must satisfy to
render their encoded brain signals copyrightable in our utilitarian
copyright system.
Although this Note focuses on BCI technology, the problems it
raises will certainly arise in other contexts. The ceaseless advance of
technology will quickly challenge our understanding of the basic precepts that once seemed absolute and upon which our legal system is
founded and its protections afforded. Progress and innovation will
force lawmakers and judges to evaluate the legality of a technology
not by the letter of the law, but rather by its spirit. This Note is demonstrative of that assertion: although our operative law indicates that
BCI-encoded thoughts are copyrightable, the Constitution indicates
otherwise, for its concern with the form that copyrightable expression
assumes is outweighed by its interest in promoting productive engagement with the arts and sciences. So too will other emergent technologies necessitate a return to nuanced scrutiny of our Constitution
and its underlying theory.

